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I. INTRODUCTION
Banking system has a strategic position as the intermediating and supporting payment 
system institution (UU No. 10/1998). As an intermediating institution, banking can give 
facilitations to channel the fund from those with excess fund (savers) in the position as the 
depositors to those who need the fund (borrowers) for various kinds of purposes. Moreover, 
banking also acts as an agent of development, can encourage the progression of economic 
improvement through credits facilities and other payment and with drawal facilities in a 
transaction process done by the economists.
The banking sector is exposed to some risks in doing its function. In order to be able to run 
its function well, it is required that the banking sector should effectively be able to manage the 
risks it faces so it can maintain its unremitting business process so the financial intermediating 
process in economy can run incessantly and efficiently. If the bank is able to reach the optimum 
efficiency level, it will support the management of the economy so it can function well. 
Systemic risk is a determining factor in constructing a country’s economic system stability 
due to some financial imperfections such as asymetric information, agency problem, and 
moral hazard which cause excessive risk taking behavior, contagion risk (domino effect) and 
procyclisation (prosiklisitas) of the financial intermediation.
The systemic risk can also be stated as a risk which can cause the failure of one or some 
financial institutions as the result of systemic events. This can be in the form of shock which 
can influence one of the institutions or shock which can influence the institution which then 
spread to another or a shock which simultaneously affect the majority of other institutions (De 
Bandt and Hartmann, 2000 and Zebua, 2010). Some researches on systemic risk potential in 
banking industry, according to Saheruddin (2009), have been done in some European countries 
(Nagy and Fox, 2005); The United States of America (Buehler and Gupta, 1987); Brazil (Barnhill 
and Souto, 2007) and in some Asian countries such as Japan (Uchida and Nakagawa, 2004) 
and Sri Langka (Tennekoon, 2002).
Whereas Adrian dan Brunnermeier (2009) stated that to conduct a measurement which 
includes systemic risk, it is better to identify the risks which exist in a system by measuring the 
individual systemic of an institution, in which this institutions are connected to one another 
and are big in size (too big to fail) so it can cause the negative spillover impact towards other 
institutions.
Systemic risk becomes a polemic in Indonesia when the government decided to save 
Century Bank by taking over (bail out) with “much too expensive” costs because the bank was 
considered as a failed bank and would create a systemic impact. This polemic happens because 
there is no scientific study or research which covers the banking systemic risks in Indonesia. 
The estimation of the bank default probabilities which is carried out by estimating the 
systemic risk requires two variables; market values and assets’ volatility. In a research conducted 
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by Lehar (2005) and Adrian and Brunnermeier (2009), they use the stock price so they can 
estimate the value. Pennacchi and Redburn (2003)  give a model to estimate the assets’ market 
value and volatility by using the bank’s financial report. The estimation is done not by using 
balance numbers but based on the profit and loss data. Tudella and Young (2003) verify Merton 
model to estimate the probability of default of the corporate companies in England so it can 
determine whether the company is failed or not. However, previously, Black and Cox (1976) did 
a generalization on the basic model of Merton which studied the obligation effect by including 
the collateral factors as the variable. 
In 2013 Bank of Indonesia as the highest national banking regulator has included systemic 
surveillance system in the framework of SSK of which main activities include the bank evaluation 
and LKBB which has systemic risk potentials as well as did some researches and analyses 
concerning the household, corporate and by sector financial system. 
Based on those experiences, the research on systemic risk for banking industry in Indonesia 
becomes very important to be done considering the effect and huge amount of cost which have 
to be guaranteed if the crisis shall happen again in the future. With this basic assumption, this 
paper estimates the systemic risks and the relation of banking finance in Indonesia by identifying 
the risks of each bank toward the banking system. Since not all of the banks are going public, 
the measurement of default bank probabilities and the measurement of systemic risk based 
on its market value and assets’ volatility are estimated by using the bank’s financial report. The 
estimation is not done by using the balance numbers but based on the profit and loss data. 
Explicitly, the aim of this research are, first, to know the probability of default value of 
each bank based on Merton model; second, to estimate the level of the risks of each bank 
individually, third, to estimate the contribution of risks from each individual bank toward banking 
system risk as a whole, fourth, to estimate the change of risks from each individual bank toward 
banking system risk as a whole; and fifth, to estimate the financial linkage between one bank 
and the others in Indonesian banking system. 
It is hoped that this paper can give positive contributions in the form of new suggestions 
to banking regulators and other related institutions in arranging banking industry regulations 
for the materialization of national financial stability and also to enrich the varieties of empirical 
studies on the systemic risk of banking industry in Indonesia. 
The second part of this paper will cover the theory, the third part will cover the data and 
the applied method, while the estimation result and its analysis will be presented in chapter four. 
The conclusion and further suggestions will be presented in the fifth chapter as the closing. 
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II. THEORY
The Concept of Systemic Risk and the Bankruptcy of a Bank 
The failure risk is the inability of a certain bank to pay for its debt and obligations. Before 
it is default, there is no other ways to clearly distinguish between the soon to be default bank 
and not. We only make probabilistic judgements from the failure possibilities. Thus, the bank 
generally pays the spread on the free-standards level of interests which is comparable with the 
default probabilities to compensate some loans.
Default is a rare enough phenomenon. Some specifics companies have probability of 
default for about 2 percent in each year, but there is no variation in the standard probability 
of the company (Moodys KMV, 2003). 
The default in one unit of a company potentially gives influence toward the industry as 
a whole. According to Adrian and Brunerrmeir (2009) the systemic risk is stated as a possibility 
if an institution is in distress, this will trigger other institutions in the banking industry to be 
distressed so it can cause the bank run and the fall of the financial banking system. Whereas 
according to Acharya (2001), systemic risk is also a shared risk of failure which emerges from 
the relationship between the return of assets from the balance side of the bank. 
De Bandt and Hartmann (2000) propose three interrelated basic characteristics within 
financial system which can give the basic principals to explain about financial fragility hypothesis, 
they are:
a. The banking structure or other financial institutions in which the banks generally reserve a 
few of their assets to fulfill the deposits withdrawal. 
b. The interconnectivities of financial institutions through direct exposure and payment 
system.
c. The intensity of the information from the financial contract and credibility problems which 
mean the expected asset value in the future and the cash flow guaranteed in the contract 
will be fulfilled.
The Causes and Indicators of Bankruptcy 
Mongid (2000) wrote that according to Hermsillo (1996) the bank failure which is often 
called as the bankruptcy of a bank consist of two different concepts, the first one is the economic 
failure or market insolvency; a situation in which the net equity of the bank becomes negative, 
or if the bank cannot continue its operation without creating loss which immediately result 
negative net equity. The second is the official failure; it is a type of failure which can be observed 
because an official agency announces its failure to the public. Official failure happens when the 
bank regulator states that the institution will not be able to operate in the long term. 
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Generally, we can differentiate the sources of bank failure, they are: 
1. Overflowing credits expansion of the bank. 
2. Asymmetrical information results in the inability of the depositors to value the assets of the 
bank accurately, especially when the financial condition of the bank is worsen. 
3. The shock is started from outside of the banking system, detached from the bank financial 
condition, which causes the depositors to change their liquidity preferences or it causes the 
reduction on the bank’s reserves. 
4. The institutional limitation and the law which weakens the bank and causes the 
bankruptcy. 
KMV Merton Model
Merton model shows that the equity can be calculated for its price and the failure 
probability can be estimated under some assumptions. The equity values can be determined 
with Black–Scholes standard in the form of: 
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
E = At Ф(d1) – L e – r (T - t) Ф(d2) 
( )
tTσ
ln
and
tT)σ(rln
d
2
1
2
1
−
−−++
=
LAt
tTdd 12 −σ−=
Probability of default is formulated as:
PD = 





−
−−−
Φ
tT
tTAL t
σ
σµ ))(()/ln( 221  
and the length of distance to default (DD) is stated in:
DD =
tT
Lln)tT)((Aln 22
1
t
−σ
−−σ−µ+
96 Bulletin of Monetary, Economics and Banking, October 2013
 and probability of default is summed up into PD = F(-DD).
Cash Flow and Asset Market Value Estimation 
Cooperstein, Pennachi and Redburn (1995) estimated the asset market value and its 
volatility using the financial report and the profit and loss data. The estimation of the auto 
regressive process equation of the cash flow is done using panel data analysis method. 
Figure 1. The probability of default or towards 
asset value. Default occurs when the final asset 
value is under the default point (shaded-in area) 
Crosbie dan Bohn (2003)
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Market Equity Et can be calculated as the present value of the whole cash flow expected 
from the future which:
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Moreover, according to Loffler and Posch (2007) the estimation of the asset market value 
and its volatility can be done by iteration approach. The estimation of the stochastic process 
of the asset of each bank is using Black-Scholes model toward market equity value and the 
value of account payable ledger. This technique is done by taking the initial volatility value (for 
example so) to calculate the assets. And then, this asset value is then used to calculate the 
volatility to calculate the return asset which then is re used again to revise the initial volatility 
value so (iteration process). The iteration process to k+1 is continued with the calculation of 
the assets market value which is shown by this equation until the convergence between the 
volatility of so and s can be achieved.
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Systemic Risk Measurement 
The first alternative which can be used is Value at Risk (VaR). VaR is a risk measurement 
method which uses statistical technique. According to Jorion (2001), VaR is generally defined 
as a method used to calculate the maximum loss which might happen when it is in a certain 
period or level of trust. 
VaR = μ-α σ 
Figure 2. The Distribution of VaR.
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The second alternative is by using financial linkage. The bank risk which correlates one 
bank to another can be seen from the financial relevance. The concept is how the Value at 
Risk of the individual bank can be influenced if other banks are in the distress condition. That 
is why other parameter is needed that is by calculating CoVaR (A|B) which means CoVaR of 
bank A is conditioned toward bank B which is in distress condition. 
98 Bulletin of Monetary, Economics and Banking, October 2013
According to Roengpitya and Rungcharoenkitkul (2010) this concept is considered as 
an externality which cannot be gained by observing individual risk value only. It is due to the 
individual risk contribution which is conditioned by the other bank individual risks DCoVaR (A|B) 
portrayed an amount of excess from the Value at Risk of bank A which is separated from Value 
at Risk of bank A itself which caused by bank B. Whereas to calculate the additional percentage 
of the value at risk towards bank A when the value at risk of bank B is in distress condition, 
it is using % DCoVaR (A|B). The bigger percentage of the value at risk contribution of bank B 
toward the value at risk of bank A, the more systemic bank B is toward bank A. 
3. METHODOLOGY
Data Collection Technique 
This research is exploratory in nature in evaluating the systemic risk of individual bank 
towards the banking system. There are four data processing techniques used as explained 
below.
The first step is calculating the banking assets; market value, especially for the banks 
who have not gone public yet. Cooperstein, Pennacchi and Redburn (2003) give a model to 
estimate the market value and volatility of the assets by using the bank’s financial report. In 
this paper, the estimation of market value of the bank assets is done by using the profit and 
loss report data. 
The return assets of each bank and the return assets of the banking system is stated 
as:
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tX  shows the return of the total assets of the whole banking system; 
and sys1tA −  shows the total assets of the banking system in the previous period. 
To gain the time variation of the distribution between Xi and Xsys, this distribution is 
estimated as the function of a string of macro variables which can influence the amount of 
assets return. In this stage, the data processing technique used is Generalize Autoregressive 
Conditional Heteroschedasticor GARCH (1,1). The equation specification to estimate the return 
value of the bank assets is:
i
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 The second stage is calculating the probability of default of the individual bank and 
banking system in general. Lehar (2005), and Adrian and Brunnermeier (2009) uses the stock 
price to estimate this probability of default quantity. In this research, we estimate the value 
VaR individual dan VaR banking system using this specification:
with VaRt
i as the value at risk of bank i in the period of t, and VaRt
sys  as the value at risk 
of the banking system within the period of t. M is the macro variable vector which includes 
SBI, JIBOR and IHSG; all of those three are calculated in their growth value. 
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The third step is calculating the parameter of Conditional Value at Risk (CoVaR) which is 
based on the Value at Risk of the individual bank and the whole banking system. This quantity 
of CoVaR actually reflects the systemic risk in the term of the influence of a bank towards the 
banking system as a whole. Technically, the estimation of CoVaRt
i is done by using the coefficient 
of the banking system estimation result and substitute the result of the VaRt
i estimation result 
towards the coefficient of gsys|i: 
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where: CoVaRt
i as the conditional value at risk of the banking system in the VaR of bank 
i; whereas as the estimated parameter. The next step is to do calculation on systemic risk 
contribution from the banking system of each individual bank in the form of: 
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The fourth step in the data processing stage is the calculation of financial linkage. In this 
paper, these four stages are used: 
a. Analyzing the equation of CoVaR(A|B) which becomes the value at risk of bank A which is 
conditioned towards the value at risk of bank B:
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b. The CoVaR (A|B) estimation
(16)
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c. The level of marginalization or the change of  DCoVaR(A|B):
ΔCoVaR(A|B)t = CoVaR(A|B)t – VaR(A)t 
d. The inter-bank financial linkage analysis by measuring the percentage of the risk changes 
of bank A conditioned by bank B:
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Data Source
The data in this research includes the monthly cash flow, the capitalization equity, assets 
and debt values as well as macro variables data (SBI rate, JIBOR dan IHSG) also includes the 
monthly financial report within the period of 2002 – 2013. The data source of the research is 
gained from the publication result of 30 public banks which have been go public and have not 
yet been go public. It includes 10 banks with the total assets of more than Rp50 quintillion, 10 
banks with the total assets of more than Rp10 quintillion until Rp50 quintillion and 10 banks 
with the assets of lower than Rp10 quintillion. 
The financial report is achieved from the CFS bank reports to the Bank of Indonesia and 
the interest rate of SBI is achieved from Bank of Indonesia. JIBOR is achieved from Indonesian 
Capital Market Directory and IHSG is originated from Indonesian Stock Market (Bursa Efek 
Indonesia/BEI) sites.
IV. RESULT AND ANALYSIS 
4.1 Probability of Default Analysis 
The default condition of a bank will potentially influence other banks so there will be some 
systemic risks problems. Thus, the failure of a certain bank is a risk which has to be measured 
and responded rationally, so the attempt on the prevention of the failure of the bank must be 
done since the early stages. 
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There are many factors which influence the payment failure of a bank. The return of the 
assets market value and its volatility are the required main factors to calculate the probability 
of default in Merton model. Before it is in default condition, there is no other way that can 
clearly differentiate between the banks which will be in the default condition and not. We can 
only observe and calculate its default chance. In this term, each bank will pay insurant which is 
comparable with the probability of default to compensate the loaner for this indeterminacy. 
The result of this research shows that for big banks, the accumulation of the average 
default risk probability reaches 42,36 percent during the research period. The maximum average 
probability of default is 93,62 percent, it was found in Bank T which has the lowest rating of 
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C. Whereas its minimum average reaches 16,9 percent which is the default risk of Bank D, 
which has the rating of A.
Referring to the migration matrix, it can be observed that the potential of Bank D to 
have the default risk in the span of one year is very small with the amount of 0,04 percent. 
Moreover to the bank which is in unstable condition, the probability of bankruptcy or area is 
also small which is only in the amount of 0,01 percent. Generally, the banks with the rating 
of A has the risk probability which is still under 1 percent that is 0,04 percent. However, the 
chance of migration to the rating of AAA (companies with the best quality, proper and stable) 
is also small with 0,07 percent. 
There is a big enough chance of migration from the banks with the rating of A to the 
rating of AA in the amount of 2,25 percent. However, the number is still considered as low 
because it is still under 5 percent. While the migration probability of the banks with the rating 
of BBB to the rating of A or from the rating of BB is almost the same with the amount of 4 
percent, and the chance to maintain in the same rating within one year is almost 90 percent. 
Bank A and Bank H are included in the classification of BBB with the probability of default 
value of 35 percent. This bank can be called as a healthy bank and the financial condition is 
satisfactory. The ability to maintain the rating of BBB is big enough that it reaches 89,3 percent. 
However, the chance to elevate the rating to A, AA or AAA is also low, each with the migration 
probability of 4,83 percent; 0,25 percent and 0,03 percent. Although it is difficult to elevate, 
the default and bankruptcy probability is also very small which is 0,22 percent. 
4.2. Systemic Risk Analysis 
VaR of Individual Bank and VaR of the System
The result of the estimation shows the mean or average of individual bank VaR reaches 
-29,87 percent. This amount of average VaR is contributed by the VaR from Bank Sand Bank 
T which is more than 50 percent. These two banks have a low performance with the rating of 
C. Aggregately, the VaR of the banking system in Indonesia has a small probability of default, 
which is shown by the VaR of the system with the amount of -3,04 percent.
According to the result of the research, the banks with low performances such as Bank 
S, Bank T and Bank X, have much bigger return asset fluctuation than the other banks. This 
paper confirms that the average value of those banks’VaR is the biggest VaR compared to the 
other banks’ VaR, it shows a very big individual risk in those Bank S, Bank T and Bank X.
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The Contribution of Individual Risk towards the Banking System 
The measurement of the amount of risk of a bank towards the banking system requires 
structural identification and the inter-bank relevance risk in the banking system, where the 
interconnected institutions can channel negative spillover towards the other institutions. To 
differentiate it with the generally understood ‘systemic’ terminology, this individual systemic risk 
is defined as the risk which is resulted by one bank towards the aggregate risk of the banking 
system as a whole. 
The impact of individual bank CoVaR towards the system’s VaR is various across the banks, 
it signifies that individual DCoVaR is significantly different between the banks. The relationship 
between the risk level of individual bank (measured by individual VaR) towards the banking 
system risk contribution (measured by DCoVaR) can be seen in Table 3. This table shows that 
the banks with the high VaR value do not always give big contribution towards the banking 
system risk. For example, Bank A has a risk contribution towards the biggest banking system 
DCoVaR = -3,13 percent (Rank number-1), having unconditional VaR with the amount of only 
-5,01 percent (rank number-28). On the contrary, Bank S, which has the biggest individual risk 
(rank number-1), but the risk contribution towards banking system as a whole DCoVaR is to 
the amount of -0,27% percent (rank number-20). 
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The percentage of the individual bank risk contribution toward the system, is linearly 
connected with the amount of the bank’s contribution towards the banking system risk 
aggregately. The higher the risk contribution, the closer its potential systemic impact towards 
banking aggregately is. According to the writer, the risk contribution towards banking can 
be categorized as having systemic impact if the risk contribution has reached more than 10 
percent. 
In this term, the main point regarding the issues of systemic risk is when one bank is in 
a trouble, so it will create panic in the financial system, so in the end it will cause the failure of 
other institutions. This can lead to a financial crisis. The most alarming thing is the simultaneous 
failure of some banks will create a serious financial crisis due to the impact of banking crisis 
towards the economy is huge. Hoggarth (2002) found that the simultaneous failure causes the 
reduction of PDB output with the average of 15 - 20 percent during the crisis.
Referring to the threshold of 10 percent above, this research has categorized which banks 
which have the potential to give systemic impact towards the banking system as a whole. The 
result of the calculation (Tabel 3) shows that form the 30 banks observed, there are 19 banks 
which have the potential to give systemic impact towards the banking system, they are Bank 
A,  Bank B,  Bank C,  Bank D,  Bank O,  Bank G,  Bank F,  Bank AA, Bank Y,  Bank X,  Bank E, 
Bank K,  Bank Z,  Bank H,  Bank L,  Bank I,  Bank U,  Bank J,  Bank W.
Figure 3.  Banking System VaR and Bank’s CoVaR
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It is interesting to analyze that the level 19 banks which are categorized as having potential 
to give systemic impact towards banking, precisely to have good enough rating from B to A 
and only two of them having the rating of CCC that are bank AA and bank O. On the other 
hand, the bank which is categorized as not having potential to give systemic impact towards 
banking system has the rating span from CCC to BB. However, as what has been stated in the 
beginning that this research is an explorative research and the result of the calculation in this 
model at least can contribute the measurable discussion foundation for all of the economic 
stakeholders.   
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The Banking Financial Linkage 
Some previous studies concluded that when smaller banks are in distress condition and 
declared as bankrupt it does not mean that those banks will not give huge systemic impact. It 
is due to the possibilities of bank run or bank panic which can emerge because the condition 
happens, especially, when the macroeconomic condition is having a downturn (economic 
recession). The study done by Simorangkir, (2006) stated that the pressure of the macroeconomic 
condition in Indonesia which happened in 1997-1998 significantly impacted towards the 
occurrence of bank runs during the period of banking crisis at that time. 
In general, it can be stated that the bank, individually, has externality towards the occurring 
system so the assessment towards the systemic risk potential of certain individual banks should 
be the center of attention of the regulator. According to Roengpitya and Rungcharoenkitkul 
(2009) the banks which seem to operate in a prudent way and have lower individual risk, are 
also possible to be able to threaten the viability of the banking system stability especially in a 
certain condition. 
According to the writer’s consideration, financial linkage CoVaR (A|B) can significantly 
be seen as having inter-bank systemic risk impact if the level of contribution percentage 
%DCoVaR(A|B) reaches more than 10 percent. If a bank has high level of financial linkage with 
other banks, when it is bankrupt, the other banks will get bigger impact. 
Table 4 shows that banks which have the average of %DCoVaR < 10% or non-systemic 
towards the banking system also have the average of %DCoVaR (A/B) < 10% or non-systemic 
towards the other banks. Whereas from 19 banks which have the average of %DCoVaR > 10% 
or systemic towards the banking system, 13 banks among them have the average of %DCoVaR 
(A/B) > 10% or systemic towards other banks and 6 of them have the average of %DCoVaR 
(A/B) < 10%  or non-systemic towards the other banks. 
However, further investigation can be done by observing Table 5. We can see that bigger 
banks such as bank A, B, C and D can condition the risk of other individual banks’ VaR with 
big enough percentage. For example, Bank A has the individual VaR level of -5.01 percent; the 
contribution of conditional value at risk of Bank A towards Bank E or DCoVaR (E|A) is to the 
amount of -2.73 percent and the contribution percentage of %DCoVaR (E|A)is to the amount 
of 19.75 percent. On the other hand, Bank E with the individual VaR level of -13.84 persen; 
the contribution of conditional value at risk of bank E towards Bank A is only to the amount 
of -0.27 percent and the percentage of %DCoVaR (A|E) is to the amount of 5.43 percent. It 
shows that Bank A can increase the risk towards Bank E from the VaRof -13.84 percent into 
-16.57 percent (systemic risk potential). On the other hand, Bank E can only increase the VaR 
risk of Bank A from minus -5.01 percent into just -5.29 percent (non systemic risk potential). 
The interesting thing is when we observe the medium bank S which has not so big amount 
of asset and non systemic towards the banking system, can only condition 6 other banks with 
%DCoVaR (A/B) > 10% which is towards 78.48% from the VaR of bank E, 14.60% from the 
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VaR of bank J, 35.62% from the VaR of bank P, 29.44% from the VaR of bank Q, 27.87% 
from the VaR of bank R and 11.35% from the VaR of Bank Y. Bank E can condition to the 
amount of 14.43% towards the VaR of bank C, in which Bank C can condition the other banks 
with big enough percentage since it is systemic in nature. Furthermore, Bank J can condition 
bank E, F, G, H where bank F and G can big enough condition bank A, B, C, D and E.  Bank 
A, B, C and D are systemic in nature. It goes furthermore, the other banks will condition each 
other towards other banks. Thus, when smaller banks are in distress condition and declared as 
bankrupt it does not mean that those banks will not give huge systemic impact
Theoretically, if there is a strong negative effect from the bank failure of one or more 
banks, the bank will be encouraged to invest in the same industry to be able to survive or fail 
altogether. This strategy is called as collective risk. The consequence of this strategy is that the 
bank will have asset which has higher correlation which leads to the higher possibility of collective 
banking failure. Acharya (2001) mentioned the occurrence of “negative externality,” which in 
fact depends on the size of the failed banks, the uniqueness of the failed banks, and the cases 
in which the operating banks do not benefited and do the failed bank facilities takeover. 
The spreading of the failed bank risk through the interconnection of institutions can 
originate from the failure of the coordination and liquidity crisis. The credence crisis does not have 
to originate from the failure risk of the opponent but it might originate from the deteriorating 
of certain spiral of asset value. However, there are other reasons in some literatures which state 
that the systemic risk is only the matter of coordination. Thus, the spreading of the crisis towards 
the liquidity to other institutions will give a systemic spreading impact towards banking. That 
is why, the systemic risk which caused by the lacking of liquidity in a financial system will give 
bigger impact to other banks at the times when the shock is spreading rapidly. 
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V. CONCLUSION
This research gives some interesting empirical conclusions which can become an opening 
discourse on banking systemic risk. By using 30 public banks as the research sample, the 
empirical conclusion which can be gained are, first, the average probability of default of the 
bank during the research period (2002 – 2013) is to the amount of 53,60 percent with the 
deviation standard of 4,81 percent. Merton model has enough special qualities because it does 
not need assumptions on the functional forms which used both as the early risk signal and the 
potential of probability of default. 
 The second empirical finding is that the default banking probability is highly influenced 
by the amount of volatility return of the bank’s asset. The higher the volatility fluctuation, the 
bigger the risk potential of a bank to be in default condition is and or vice versa too.
On the individual bank level, the third empirical finding is that the VaR risk of individual 
bank is found with the average amount of -29,87 percentand VaR of banking system is only 
to the amount of -3,04 percent. This unconditional VaR value of each bank can be used to 
portray how big the risk is towards the banking system.
With the analysis of interbank financial linkage, this research gives the fourth conclusion 
that the individual bank risk which is conditioned towards the other individual bank risks has 
the average CoVaR(A|B) to the amount of -31,07 percent. Each bank gives different additional 
risk when the bank is in distress. 
The average amount of the additional risk contribution of the bank which is conditioned 
by the other banks is to the amount of-1,21% and the average of contribution percentage 
%DCoVaR(A|B) is to the amount of 9,69 percent. This parameter is actually linearly related 
with the amount of systemic risk contribution. The higher the risk contribution, the higher the 
systemic risk contribution percentage is. This is the fifth empirical finding. 
Those five empirical findings above show that generally, each bank has externality 
towards banking system as a whole, so the assessment on the potential of systemic risk in 
certain individual banks deserve to be noted by the regulator. Smaller banks or the banks which 
seem to operate in a prudent way and lower individual risk, are not possible to threaten the 
sustainability of the banking system stability especially in some certain conditions.The empirical 
finding in this research needs to be considered by both the government and the financial 
authority (Bank of Indonesia,Financial Service Authority or Lembaga Penjamin Simpanan (Saving 
Assurance Institution)), to be made as a suggestion in the creation of the more accurate rules 
and policies.
This research needs further improvement first on the term of the amount of data observed 
and the number of the observation needs to be increased; second, the need to consider the 
roles of external factors in the modeling of the financial linkage equations; the third, the need 
to confront and further analyze the amount of the threshold used in determining the banking 
systemic risk.
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